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Introduction 
Dina Siegel (Free University Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
This issue of our CIROC Newsletter presents a wide range of subjects, including two experi-
ments. The first experiment concerns the idea of providing young scientists from Europe an
opportunity to present their work in one or another field of research on organized crime. It is
presented here in the form of an article by Jana Arsovska, a Macedonian criminologist from
Leuven University in Belgium. She describes the rise and development of organized crime in
Macedonia, a Yugoslav Republic which used to enjoy the reputation of being ‘an oasis of peace’
in the Balkans. Arsovska writes about criminal activities in the context of local conflicts, eco-
nomic instability, post-war traumas and state corruption. The second experiment has to do
with understanding organized crime issues through other relevant fields in criminology. The
present case deals with the links between organized crime and criminal youth groups, between
‘gangsters’ and ‘gangs’. Frank van Gemert, criminologist at the Vrije Universiteit in
Amsterdam, sketches a picture of youth groups in the Netherlands in general and in
Amsterdam in particular and discusses the problems relating to their stigmatisation in Dutch
society.
In line with the traditional policy of the CIROC Newsletter, this issue includes three contri-
butions on recent research in the Netherlands. Henk van de Bunt analyses cases of business
racketeering and investments by crime groups in legitimate enterprises. The involvement of
lawyers, real estate dealers, and financial institutions is crucial in this context. Edward
Kleemans presents the results of the final report of the WODC project (the Research and
Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice) on the phenomenon of underground
banking. Richard Staring’s recent research on the organization of human smuggling in the
Netherlands focuses on cases of Chinese traffickers. He challenges the prevailing stereotype of
the large-scale professional human smuggling organization.
Last but not least, this issue presents new Dutch publications on different aspects of organized
crime in the Netherlands. Damian Zaitch reviews a recent book on cocaine smuggling. 
THE ‘OASIS OF CORRUPTION AND CRIME - THE MACEDONIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Jana Arsovska, PhD researcher, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Special contribution: Evgenij Najdov, Research Analyst, World Bank Office, Macedonia
What happened to the ‘oasis of peace’?
During the hectic years following the fall of communism in the Balkan region, one of the
Yugoslav Republics was internationally labelled “an oasis of peace” for almost a decade.
Macedonia, a small country with approximately 2 million citizens, situated in the heart of the
Balkan region, links Belgrade, the capital of Serbia-Montenegro, to Thessaloniki in Greece on
the Aegean Sea; and Istanbul in Turkey to Durres in Albania on the Mediterranean Sea.
Chancellor Bismarck once correctly noted that whoever controls Macedonia controls the entire
Balkan Peninsula. 
This brings us to the question who controls Macedonia. Every country in one way or another
has some type of ‘mafia’ operating within its territory, but in Macedonia people often say that
only in their motherland the ‘mafia’ has its own country. This may very well be an exaggera-
tion of the scale of criminal activities in the country, but certain developments suggest that the
problem is indeed significant. As in any problem solving exercise, a clear understanding of the
Analysis
problem is a necessary condition for its solution. We do not claim to provide a precise assess-
ment of all criminal activities in Macedonia, but we will try to present a broad review of the
spectrum of crime in the country. 
Criminal activity in Macedonia found a fertile ground amid regional and local conflicts, tense
interethnic relations, rapid political change, an economic downturn, state corruption and eth-
nic Albanian criminality. As a result, this small country was quickly drawn into the criminal
networks so pervasive in the surrounding region. Macedonia’s decade-long reputation as an
‘oasis of peace’ gradually changed into an ‘oasis of corruption and crime’. It is sad to observe
how organized criminal networks managed to exploit the advantage once observed by
Bismarck.
Because Macedonia remained relatively peaceful in a very turbulent region, it did not attract a
great deal of international attention during the 90’s, and was ‘isolated’ from the EU and other
broader political initiatives. This unintentional isolation resulted in a unique way of dealing
with social and economic issues, as well as a unique transformation from a planned economy
to a market economy. The transition was conceptualised in such a way that it  facilitated poli-
tical elites with dubious backgrounds to influence policy and process. Consequently, even
though not de jure illegal, from a moral perspective the transition can be described as legalized
crime. Changes in government since 1998 failed to correct this anomaly, as it turned out that
the lack of institutional accountability and a corrupt and inefficient judicial system made it
more profitable to become ‘partner in crime’ than to fight it. Additionally, in order to uphold
the ‘peace’ in the country, the authorities turned a blind eye to many other forms of crime such
as prostitution, racketeering, drug trafficking, etc. 
As a consequence of its strategic location, Macedonia also swiftly found its place on the Balkan
road, that has traditionally served as a passage for the shipment of criminal goods from the
Near and Middle East to Western Europe. There are many different starting points for the
Balkan road, depending on the criminal goods in question. Yet no matter whether one travels
from north to south, or from east to west, the mountain passes in Macedonia offer a most
accessible route, and as a result Macedonia became part of most of these routes. 
The severe economic conditions in Macedonia have encouraged people to participate in the
grey economy (estimated by some sources at 30-40 % of the GDP) and to avoid paying taxes,
as well as getting involved in different types of criminal activities. The unemployment rate
(depending on the measures used) varies between 30-45%; a number of enterprises employing
thousands of workers have collapsed or are set to close down; 25-30% of the population live
below the national poverty line; and 70% of the population confessed to having just enough
money to buy the bare necessities. Yet, if a western European citizen visits Macedonia, he/she
will be amazed at the wealth in certain parts of the country. Statistics and dry calculations do
not do justice to the reality of Macedonia. With an average salary of less than 200 euros per
month, rampant corruption among government officials and a criminal justice system that is
barely functioning, many people are tempted to get involved in criminal activities. Concepts
of morality change when one needs to buy food for one’s family and raise children (Najadov,
2003).
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Although crime seems to be flourishing in Macedonia, criminal activities are not immediately
visible. The general calm and safety that people experience in Skopje led one OSCE worker to
remark that, except for Liechtenstein, Skopje is the safest place in Europe. It is true that police
sirens are rarely heard on the streets of Skopje. It is also true that very few people will go to the
police if they have been victims of smaller crimes, such as burglary, theft, minor physical inju-
ries, or racketeering. One reason is the low level of confidence in the corrupt and indifferent
police force. The second reason is fear of retaliation and revenge by the offender. The third rea-
son is an outcome of the Macedonian macho society, where real men solve their own problems
instead of calling the police. Finally, another important factor is the general acceptance of crime
as a modus vivendi: it pays off to be a criminal. People usually observe that “everyone does it
and only few get punished”, thus providing a rational argument and moral justification for their
own involvement in criminal activities. These and many other reasons contributed to the accep-
tance by the general population of certain crimes as a way of survival in a lawless society. 
Areas of criminality in Macedonia
In this brief overview of the crime situation in Macedonia we must first of all mention prosti-
tution. The prostitution rings usually begin in Bulgaria, where women from Romania,
Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus are assembled. As part of the Balkan route, Macedonia
does not only serve as a transit country, but also as a country of destination. There are approxi-
mately 300 night bars in Macedonia where women are forced into prostitution. According to
the Ministry of Home Affairs, 273 night bars were registered in the country in November
2002. These are all legal businesses, but the girls who frequent these bars are forced prostitutes.
Furthermore, there are 23 illegal bars and in all of them prostitution is practiced. According
to police experts the number of trafficked women in Macedonia from southeast European
countries is close to 3000 (Nebiu, 2003).
Secondly, large quantities of opium and other drugs destined for Europe are smuggled through
Macedonia. The raw material comes from the ‘Golden Crescent’ (Pakistan, Iran, and
Afghanistan) and the Caucasus (Georgia and Armenia), is then processed in Turkey and begins
its Balkan journey. The Asian narcotics are smuggled across the Bulgarian-Macedonian border,
finding their way into the Albanian areas of western Macedonia. To give an indication of its
importance: the Balkan route accounts for 70-90 % of all heroin seizures in Europe (Balkan-
Albania-Kosovo-Heroin-Jihad, 2000).
Thirdly, the cigarette industry is big business in Macedonia, as the country is a major produ-
cer of tobacco. Counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes and other brand product names are packaged
and shipped to Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro, from where they are sent to Western Europe.
Original products of major brand names are also being smuggled across the Macedonian bor-
der to Western markets. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a store in the duty free zone Blace
(the border between Kosovo and Macedonia) sells enough cigarettes to meet the demand of
the entire Balkan region for that particular brand (Lucky Strike). The domestic market for these
cigarettes in Macedonia is lucrative since the state tax is avoided. Finally, racketeering, illegal
sex-agencies, illegal migration, assassinations, false passport and visa forgery, are also part of the
‘oasis of corruption and crime’.
Ethnicity and crime
Ethnic Albanians account for approximately 1/4 of the Macedonian population. It is a com-
mon belief among Macedonians from all walks of life that ethnic Albanians are responsible for
the bulk of criminal activities that take place in and sometimes outside of Macedonia. Even
former president Kiro Gligorov, one of the most respected politicians in the short history of
Macedonia, clearly stated during an interview in December 2000: “generally we can not speak
about it, but it is a common truth that certain parts of the population, like the Albanians and others,
are more involved in crime than the Macedonians”. In statistical terms, ethnic Albanians account
for over 50% of all serious crimes (according to Macedonian sources) and 80% of the prison
population (according to Albanian sources)(Hislope, 2001). 
Is all this true or is the criminalization of the Albanian community just a form of racism and
scapegoating? If you live in Macedonia it is not difficult to point out the areas  where most cri-
minal activities take place. Velesta, Aracinovo, Mala Recica, Zelino, Kondovo, all cities with a
mostly ethnic Albanian population. It is also true that nowadays the fast growth of Albanian
organized crime groups in Europe is a well acknowledged phenomenon. Many international
organizations, such as Europol and Interpol, a number of institutes and Ministries of different
countries (Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Belgium, etc.), the US
Drug Enforcement Agency, as well as the Paris-based Global Drugs Monitor (Observatoire
Geopolitique Des Drogues) all concur on this point. They claim that these particular organized
crime groups are well positioned for rapid growth. In the words of a top Italian prosecutor,
“Albanian organized crime has become a point of reference for all criminal activity today. Everything
passes via the Albanians. The road for drugs and arms and people, meaning illegal immigrants destined
for Europe, is in Albanian hands” (Barron, 2000).
These days, there are very few criminal markets were ethnic Albanian organized crime groups
are not involved. But could these groups be as successful as they are without political backup
and a safe heaven from where they can operate? To return to the beginning of this article, in
Macedonia the ‘mafia’ has its own country and someone allowed that to happen. While cor-
rupt state officials were busy getting rich with their high class crimes such as selling state pro-
perty, someone had to do the violent and dirty work. Prostitution, arms and drugs are the core
competencies of the ethnic Albanian criminals, whereas most white collar crimes are perpetra-
ted by corrupt Macedonian officials. We could call this ‘a fair division of labour’, all in the
name of the ‘oasis of peace’. Who said that ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians can not
cooperate?
The European dimension
But do we really have to measure which ethnic group did the most harm to Macedonia? The
reality is that Macedonia is harmed and it needs help. The prime minister of Macedonia has
just recently resigned, stating that he was unable to bring any reforms and improve the situa-
tion in Macedonia with a corrupt coalition partner (DUI) blocking him at every step. Should
we simply ignore his statement and pretend that nothing is wrong? There are only two possi-
ble roads for Macedonia to take: the road towards European integration or the road that will
lead the country to become the cancer of Europe. It is a fact that Macedonia can not fight the
problem of corruption and crime by itself. Macedonia needs Europe and Europe cannot afford
to abandon Macedonia since its problems are likely to spread to the rest of the continent. In
today’s globalized world, threats are also global and European stability will always be threate-
ned by the existence of a ‘crippled’ Macedonia. Helping Macedonia is a win-win game for
everyone.
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GANGS AND GANG STEREOTYPES IN THE NETHERLANDS
Frank van Gemert, Free University Amsterdam
Recently, the municipality of Amsterdam has made an inventory of youth groups throughout
the city. In total, 118 groups were found, that ranged from ‘bothersome groups’ (86), to ‘nui-
sance groups’ (26) and ‘criminal groups’ (6) (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005). Along this line
groups are said to be less sensible to authority and more prone to criminal activities. Because
of their profession, policemen on the beat (in the case of Amsterdam: buurtregisseurs) have prac-
tical knowledge of what goes on in the streets. They play a key role in this inventory. 
Nowadays, the city of Amsterdam not only makes an inventory, but also has a set plan on how
to approach and deal with youth groups. The regular ones can be offered free time activities in
a youth center or at the place where they hang out. The municipality plays a facilitating role
in doing this. In the more serious youth groups individuals will receive a more tailored treat-
ment, depending on their criminal status. 
When speaking about the latter, the word ‘gang’ (in Dutch: ‘jeugdbende’) may come to mind,
but in official documents it is not used. In Amsterdam, it seems like these words are avoided
in order not to make the problem bigger than it really is. This has to do with the fact that in
Europe stereotypical images of American gangs lead to misinterpretation. It is said that gangs
are hierarchical and have leaders; that they can easily be recognized by symbols in clothing,
graffiti and tattoos; that they have rules and initiation procedures; that they are violent and cri-
minal; that they sell drugs and therefore protect their ‘turf ’. Some of these ideas go back to
films such as ‘The Westside Story’, others are derived from rap music and popular media ima-
ges, mainly those from Crips and Bloods in Los Angeles. These are the gangs most people refer
to. Now, if one asks Europeans about gangs, they often reply that gangs, ‘like those in America’,
do not exist in their vicinity. However, gangs of the referred stereotype are rare in the US as
well. For example, Decker and Van Winkle (1996) interviewed gang members in St Louis and
concluded that gangs seldom have stable leadership; they have no explicit rules or formal
gatherings; initiation procedures are not reported. When gangs are involved in drug sales, the
organization is primitive and profits are low because of personal consumption. Klein (2000)
labeled this double misinterpretation of American and European gangs ‘the Eurogang para-
dox’. So, just like the well known mafia image produced a foggy view on organized crime,
gangs can easily be misunderstood because of popular stereotypes. 
It is interesting to note that not just officials perceive gangs through stereotypes, street youth
do the same. In the mid ‘90s Rotterdam and especially the Hague had several youth groups
that called themselves Crips (Van Gemert 1998). The members wore blue, used gang argot and
hand signs as if they were living in Los Angeles. Though some of these groups committed stick-
ups and street robberies, others consisted of members that were just dressing according to the
latest mode and had little to do with crime. Gang symbols were used, but not just by gang
members. The media produced images that appealed to law abiding and criminal youth alike.
At that point, these Crips groups consisted almost entirely of Antillean and Surinamese boys,
because gangs were considered a ‘black thing’. Even though in reality the majority does not fit
this ethnic category (Curry et al. 1994), in the media gangs were portrayed as Afro-American.
With the immense attention for (gangsta) rap music, over the years, images have changed.
Nowadays rap music is color free, and, along the same line, the gangsta lifestyle is no longer
exclusive for a specific ethnicity (Van Gemert 2005a). In the Netherlands, Moroccan boys
make for the most common ethnic category in youth groups  (Van Gemert 2005b). 
False stereotypes can cause the misunderstanding of a phenomena and may lead to ineffective
measures. The key to a successful response to gangs lies in the recognition of what gangs real-
ly are like. This relates to several aspects of gangs, but it is especially true when it comes to hier-
archy and leadership. Since in Amsterdam, as in other Dutch cities, the police plays an impor-
tant role in dealing with youth groups e.g. gangs, their perception of gangs is crucial. 
Dutch policemen have implicit but strong beliefs on how to act when it comes to youth
groups. Repeatedly it has been said that dealing with them can best be done by addressing the
leaders. Once identified who the leaders are, one can either communicate through them and
bring the group to change its conduct, or one can take the leaders from the group and it will
disintegrate. This seems as a logic approach, but the assumptions must be correct to make it
work? An ethnographic research on a Moroccan gang in Amsterdam-West has produced some
new facts on how groups like these operate (Van Gemert & Fleisher 2005). Especially the
aspect of leadership is interesting. 
The members of this group in Amsterdam-West form a durable street oriented youth group
whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity. This group consists of 24
boys. It is a Moroccan group, with only a few non-Moroccan members. These 24 boys are the
steady members, a number of others have less stable positions. Girls are not part of the group.
The group has been around for at least 4 years and in that period new boys have joined and
others have retired. The group has no name, no specific symbols, no territory, and there are no
‘wars’ with other youth groups.
The group is egalitarian. It has no ranks, nor does it have subgroups that are formalized in any
sense. When asked, the boys say the group has no leader. Of course this does not mean the
boys are all alike or that they would all behave the same way. Some boys are older and stron-
ger than others are, and they will not allow the younger ones to beat them in a game or to
make fun of them. On the other hand, younger boys will not obey the older ones. There is no
one in the group that can tell another boy what to do. Still, in certain situations boys can take
a steering role, and some boys are more likely to play those roles than others do. We could
observe situations that end in conflict where a certain boy would be a catalyst and pull the
group beyond neutrality. He gets into an argument with someone. At this point group mem-
bers present can intervene, but he confronts the other party and might get into a one on one
fight. In this situation the others cannot stand idle, they will join in and help the boy. Certain
boys do this over and again. They are not respected for doing this. On the one hand, when
they are around something is bound to happen and that means boredom has no chance. On
the other hand, most boys have learned that these members get the group into trouble and they
hate to get in contact with the police for something stupid. The problem is, once again, that
the individual cannot be told what to do. He won’t listen, because within this group a docile
obedient person counts for nothing. 
Ethnographers give a description from the group as it looks from the inside. The group in
Amsterdam-West has no leaders, so much is clear from the data gathered through interviews
and participant observation. Although at some instances it can be clear that some boys take a
leading role, there are no individuals that can be labeled as leaders. One cannot steer this group
nor will it collapse as interventions are targeted on the ‘leader’. This gang, and possibly most
gangs, simply do not work that way. Just like organized crime, gangs don’t live up to their ste-
reotypes. Gangs can only be understood and dealt with if stereotypes don’t get in the way.  
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BUSINESS RACKETEERING IN THE NETHERLANDS
Henk van de Bunt. Erasmus University Rotterdam
One of the greatest concerns in regards to organised crime is that criminal groups invest the
proceeds of crime in legitimate enterprises, or that licit and illicit businesses join forces. These
are the so-called ‘symbiotic relationships’ between organised crime and its legitimate environ-
ment, which are characterized by mutual benefits and common interests. Several instances of
these relationships have been found in the Netherlands, involving, among others, financial
institutions, lawyers, real estate dealers, and car rental firms, who have business dealings with
criminal groups in the full knowledge that the money, products or services in question are deri-
ved from illegal sources.
The greatest worry is that criminal groups are not only out to make a profit, but also try to
gain control of a particular sector. It appears from Letizia Paoli’s Mafia Brotherhoods that this
combination is characteristic of Italy’s Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta, and that this is what
distinguishes the mafia from ‘ordinary’ organised crime. According to Paoli, mafia groups and
their members are actively involved in a wide range of business activities: they not only trade
in a variety of illegal commodities, but also use violence and intimidation to dominate vital
areas of the legitimate economy (p. 174). A well-known example of this, also described by
Letizia Paoli, is the role of organised crime in the construction industry. Mafia groups can set
up and stabilize cartel agreements, and this allows them to play a decisive role in public ten-
ders for construction projects.  
In this respect, the mafia is clearly different from organised crime groups in the Netherlands
and in many other Western European countries. A few years ago, this was confirmed once
again, when a large-scale parliamentary inquiry into antitrust crimes in the Dutch construction
industry revealed that construction firms systematically arranged among themselves how to
submit tenders for a contract; who would be awarded the contract; and for what price.
Interestingly, the role of organised crime in these practices was completely non-existent, while
hundreds of legitimate construction firms were heavily involved in price-fixing and secretly
arranging the allocation of projects. In other words: an abundance of organisational crime, but
no involvement by organised crime.
The situation in the construction industry illustrates the position of organised crime in rela-
tion to the legitimate environment in the Netherlands: there are symbiotic relationships, but
organised crime is not orchestrating events in the political arena or in the business world.
However, several recent incidents cast a new light on the relations between organised crime and
the legitimate world. The most important  case involved a real estate dealer who was killed by
a hitman in front of his Amsterdam office in 2004. Starting in the 1980s, he built a real estate
empire estimated to be worth around 300 million euros (in 2001). In the 1990s, rumours
began to circulate that he owed at least part of his wealth to the fact that he invested the pro-
ceeds of drugs crimes in real estate on behalf of a number of known criminals. Up until this
point, the affair looked like a ‘normal’ case of a symbiotic relationship between organised crime
and a real estate dealer. Recently, however, leaked police reports and journalistic research have
revealed how desperate he was during his last years. His symbiosis with several criminals appa-
rently took a turn for the worse after the year 2000. Symbiosis allegedly turned into extortion
and attempts by criminal elements to take control of his business. Excerpts from his diary,
published a year after his assassination, show how he was forced by threats as well as physical
violence to hand over large sums of money to his former criminal business partners. 
Several other cases - currently under police investigation - in which other real estate dealers and
businessman are involved also points to extortion and the use of intimidation and violence in
business transactions. It would appear that in the world of real estate, particularly in
Amsterdam, symbiotic relationships have evolved into parasitic relationships. Criminals who
have gained access to the  market, use it not to invest the proceeds of crime, but to gain con-
trol of key figures and to extort as much money from them as possible. These are the first indi-
cations of the occurrence of business racketeering related to organised crime in the
Netherlands. Our examples reveal unexpected dynamics in the relations between organised
crime and the legitimate world: symbiosis between organised crime and the legitimate envi-
ronment may evolve into extortion and parasitism. It is an intriguing question whether or not
these cases of racketeering are a precursor of more control by organised crime of legitimate sec-
tors. Will the methods of ‘ordinary’ Dutch organised criminals start to resemble the tried and
tested methods of Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta?
UNDERGROUND BANKING AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
Dr Edward R. Kleemans (WODC)
The dramatic 9/11 attacks made financial control of terrorism a high priority policy issue and
put the phenomenon of so-called ‘underground banking’ high on the agenda. Long before
9/11 the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Dutch Ministry of Justice had
already commissioned a literature review on this issue, which was published in 1999 (Passas
1999). This review debunked a lot of myths about underground banking. It particularly high-
lighted the long history of these informal value transfer systems as well as the perfectly legiti-
mate aims of labour migrants using these systems to send their money home. As a follow-up
WODC sponsored empirical research into criminal abuse of informal value transfer systems
(IVTS). 7 Dutch police investigations were analysed by a WODC research team, while Passas
studied 15 North American and Indian cases. The final report of this project has been published
in 2005, accompanying a letter to the Dutch Parliament about backgrounds, risks and policy
approaches (Passas 2005a; Ministry of Finance/Ministry of Justice 2005). 
The results of the WODC-part of the study were published already in the second report of the
Dutch ‘organized crime monitor’ (Kleemans et al. 2002). It was concluded that the reasons
that make IVTS attractive to labour migrants, are also the ones that make it vulnerable to cri-
minal abuse: these systems are rather informal, anonymous, fast, and substantial amounts of
money can be transferred at a relatively low cost. However, underground banking systems are
not as secretive as is often suggested in the scientific and popular literature. Underground ban-
kers often use phones, faxes and official banking accounts. In addition, beneficiaries do not
identify themselves by the oft-mentioned ‘torn bank note’, but by their own names or passport
numbers. Another myth is the idea that underground banking leaves no traces. Underground
bankers do leave traces, by using faxes and (mobile) telephones and by keeping accounts as
well. As a result there are more opportunities for law enforcement to target criminal abuse than
is generally assumed. Finally, the analysed cases show that underground bankers are able to
transfer substantial amounts of money. Go-betweens, such as people changing money for cri-
minal groups, play an important role in bringing criminal groups into contact with under-
ground bankers from different ethnic backgrounds.
In the final report these findings are corroborated by North American and Indian cases (Passas
2005). The substantial amounts of money that can be handled by IVTS clearly contradict sug-
gestions earlier made in the literature. Just as the perfectly legitimate needs of labour migrants
cannot be denied, neither can the potential abuse of these systems by professional criminals
and terrorists be negated (see also Passas 2005b). In addition, Passas states that even if remit-
ters and recipients deal with honest money, the cash pool on which the IVTS operators draw
may contain dirty funds as well. Furthermore, the settlement process between IVTS operators
may go through very shady operations and transactions. Finally, Passas concludes that trade-
related or trade-based value transfer systems are extremely sensitive, as they allow for the secret
circulation of substantial amounts of money but need to be monitored without unduly ham-
pering the legitimate international trade. Therefore, the main policy view of Passas is that poli-
cies - based upon empirical research - must seek a balance between law enforcement interests
and the interests of both migrant workers and legitimate trade.
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ORGANIZED HUMAN SMUGGLING TO AND THROUGH THE NETHERLANDS 
Richard Staring (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands)
Just before the summer holidays of 2005, the Dutch National Criminal Investigation Service
arrested ten members of a violent Chinese gang. All detainees were suspected of human smug-
gling, as well as drug trafficking, extortion and liquidations. Police not only found large
amounts of drugs and money, but also came across 24 automatic firearms, among which seve-
ral Uzis. The Chinese gang members were allegedly heavily involved in smuggling Chinese
from their home country through the Netherlands to the United Kingdom. Smuggled immi-
grants had to pay up to forty or even fifty thousand euros for their journey and according to
the police, gang members would not hesitate to use violence against defaulters. In addition,
the police mentioned links between some of the arrested gang members and previously appre-
hended snakeheads of other Chinese smuggling organizations (Meeus 2005).
Since the turn of the millennium, Chinese in the Netherlands have acquired the reputation of
being deeply involved in professionally organized human smuggling through Eastern
European countries to the UK. They use harbour cities like Rotterdam as their safe house. The
involvement of Chinese immigrants with human smuggling in the Netherlands became clear-
ly manifest as a result of the Dover case. Already in an early stage of this investigation the poli-
ce made clear that until then only executives had been arrested, instead of the organizers of the
fatal transport of the Chinese to the UK. With the arrest of the notorious Sister P. and some
of her gang members during 2002, Dutch police were convinced that they had captured one
of the main snakeheads behind the Dover transport. Although the court convicted Sister P. for
organized human smuggling, they did not find enough evidence to relate her to the death of
the 58 Chinese from Dover or to any other responsibility in relation to this transport. Only
one year later, in 2003, members of another Chinese criminal organization were apprehended
in Rotterdam and again it was claimed that this smuggling organization had links to the orga-
nization behind the Dover tragedy (Meerhof 2003). 
The Dover case put the law’s focus on human smuggling organizations in the European Union
and the Netherlands. In 2004, the newly established National Criminal Investigation Service,
put in place to combat organized crime in the Netherlands, designated human smuggling as
one of the seven main areas of organized crime that needed their special attention. In January
2005, an amendment of the law on human smuggling was implemented. One of the main
changes was the removal of the ‘profit element’ from article 197a of the Criminal Code. As a
consequence, Public Prosecutors no longer have to prove that smugglers are motivated by pro-
fit. Instead, people accused of smuggling have to prove that they are altruistically or idealisti-
cally motivated. 
These different Chinese smuggling cases seem to indicate that human smuggling has became
a lucrative business, and is committed by highly organized, and professional, large-scale cri-
minal organizations. But do these insights into organized human smuggling in the
Netherlands that resulted from the arrests of several sizable, violent, and professionally orga-
nized Chinese smuggling networks, present a true and accurate picture of human smuggling
to and through the Netherlands? The answer to this question must be a resounding ‘no’. First
of all, it is evident that the majority of illegal immigrants do not come to the Netherlands with
the help of criminal organizations, but enter legally. An analysis of over three hundred stories
of illegal immigrants living in the Netherlands revealed that around fifty five per cent came
with a visa (usually a tourist visa) sponsored by relatives or friends, or were smuggled into the
country by family or friends living in the Netherlands. Another ten percent of the illegal immi-
grants came on their own initiative, without the help of family, friends or smugglers. The same
analysis shows that around one third of the illegal immigrants - especially those who applied
for asylum in the Netherlands - were facilitated by human smugglers in one way or another
(Staring 2004). This is not unique to the Dutch situation, as other researchers have reached
similar conclusions about the entrance of illegal immigrants in different countries (see for
instance Spener 2004). 
Recently, we published The social organization of human smuggling (Staring, Engbersen et al.
2005), a study based on a detailed analysis of eleven large-scale police investigations into orga-
nized human smuggling, all carried out in and around the harbour city of Rotterdam. In these
police investigations, thirteen separate human smuggling networks could be distinguished. In
our report, we developed a continuum of human smuggling organizations, ranging from the
so-called ‘criminal negotiation network’ to the so-called ‘criminal command network’ at the
other end of the continuum. We classified the human smuggling networks on the basis of two
network characteristics borrowed from organizational sociology. Domination, the first dimen-
sion, was analysed, firstly, by looking at who is in control and how control is implemented
within the criminal network and, secondly, by looking at the type of relationship between the
gang members and their customers. Violence or the threat of violence, both within the net-
work as well as towards the smuggled immigrants, was also taken into account. Coordination,
the second network dimension, was explored by distinguishing the different tasks within the
process of human smuggling, and by looking at who takes care of these tasks. In addition to
these two dimensions, we also looked at the transnational embeddedness of the criminal net-
works. 
The criminal command network resembles the classic image of a hierarchical criminal organi-
zation, with a clear leader at the top who is in control of his subordinates. Money, violence, or
the threat of violence, are important mechanisms to keep control of the gang members. The
relationship with the customers can be characterized as business-like at best. Abduction as well
as mistreatment of smuggled immigrants by gang members, with the purpose of extracting hig-
her fees, were commonplace. In terms of coordination, these criminal networks are characte-
rized by their large scale and by the large number of people involved, each one of them assig-
ned a limited numbers of tasks. These criminal networks were more heterogeneous in terms of
their ethnic composition than the criminal negotiation networks, but similar to the criminal
negotiation network, the criminal command network is strongly embedded within the ethnic
community, and outsiders rarely perform vital tasks within the human smuggling network. 
Within the criminal negotiation network it is much more difficult to point to a specific leader
or hierarchical structure. No one appears to be really in control of the other members of the
network and the threat of violence is absent, both between the smugglers, as well as towards
the smuggled immigrants, who are free to go as they like. The relationships within the crimi-
nal network and between the smugglers and their customers are much less business-like and
more often dominated by kinship, friendship or ethnicity. The prices smuggled immigrants
have to pay, are much closer to the ‘real costs’ than the exorbitant prices charged within the
criminal command networks. Criminal negotiation networks operate on a much smaller scale,
and a small number of members perform a range of different tasks. At the same time, there are
many outsiders who only once in a while engage in network activities. These criminal negoti-
ation networks are also distinguished by their closed character based on ethnicity: the smug-
glers and their customers belong to the same ethnic group. 
The Dutch police classified all the human smuggling organizations we studied under the hea-
ding of organized crime. The cases of the professional Chinese smuggling organizations des-
cribed earlier perfectly fit the image of the criminal command network, but the majority of the
networks analysed in The social organization of human smuggling, resembled much more the cri-
minal negotiation network. It could be stated that these human smuggling organizations often
fit the image of the small-scale criminal enterprise, where economic motives go together with
kinship-based loyalties. The large-scale, violent, and professionally organized human smug-
gling networks, such as the Chinese gangs described in the introduction of this contribution,
still seem to be the exception rather than the rule.
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DUTCH COCAINE MIDDLE MARKETS
Damián Zaitch (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands)
Gruter, P. and D. van de Mheen (2005) Cocaïnehandel in Nederland: impressies van deel-
nemers in drugsdistributie netwerken. Rotterdam: IVO (pp. 129)
This study aims to describe cocaine distribution in the Netherlands as seen through the eyes
of its participants, showing which structures and working methods are involved and which
background factors explain the participation of these persons in the cocaine trade. Gruter
managed to interview 37 Rotterdam cocaine retail dealers and 24 detained persons involved in
the higher levels of cocaine distribution, transport and import, collecting very valuable data on
their experiences in the business between the mid-1990s and 2004.
While most retailers in the sample are linked to the street base cocaine circuit, only few of them
are powder cocaine dealers supplying the recreational market. Respondents from upper levels
include suppliers for domestic (as well as foreign) middle market traders, ‘brokers’, co-finan-
ciers of transports, transporters, import agents and ‘helpers’ of exporters who are involved in
activities such as smuggling, stashing and money collection. There is an overrepresentation of
respondents with a Dutch ethnic background who have also been involved in dealing XTC.
The interviews show that the business structure and working methods within local cocaine
distribution in the Netherlands are strongly connected to the way cocaine is imported into the
country. Therefore, the authors distinguish between large-scale cocaine import (mainly via sea-
ports and in some cases via road transport) and small-scale import (mainly via Amsterdam’s
Schiphol Airport). 
Large-scale cocaine import and the middle market that evolves from this import appear to be
the domain of people who are active in several other illegal activities. They have good know-
ledge of the expedition and transport sectors, and their operations appear to be seldom desti-
ned for the Dutch local market. Remarkably, when cocaine is transported to other European
countries these transports often do not only consist of cocaine, but are combined shipments
with other hard (especially amphetamine and XTC) and soft drugs (hashish). The heroin trade
remains in the hands of different trading networks. This research also shows that many parti-
Book reviews
cipants make a profit as intermediaries or ‘brokers’, without ever coming into actual contact
with the drugs. 
An interesting finding of the research is that the Dutch local cocaine market seems to be almost
completely supplied by small-scale imports via the Schiphol Airport. However, part of these
small-scale cocaine imports is also in transit to further destinations. None of the 37 respon-
dents active in the Rotterdam market as cocaine retail dealers reported being supplied by large-
scale cocaine imports. More than half of these respondents are themselves engaged in small-
scale cocaine smuggling, mainly as body packers or luggage carriers, almost always acting
under the orders of others. The supply line along which the cocaine reaches the local retail dea-
lers appears to be very short. It is rare to find more than one middleman between importation
and the retail level. At the cocaine retail level participants are often dealing in both cocaine and
heroin. This is, however, especially characteristic of respondents involved in the retailing of
base cocaine (crack).
Regarding the factors that explain their involvement in the cocaine business, there appear to
be two basic categorizations. The primary feature distinguishing these two is whether the res-
pondent is addicted to hard drugs or not. About 75% of the cocaine retail dealers are addicts
themselves, and their addiction seem to play an important role in determining their position
in the cocaine distribution chain. In nearly all cases, their own hard drug use was the primary
motive for their initial decision to start dealing drugs. However, their financial situation is very
weak due to their own drug use. This stands in clear contrast to participants of middle and
import levels, who show a relatively controlled recreational use of soft and sometimes hard
drugs. 
Based on the respondents’ life histories, the authors distinguish three main roads leading
towards involvement in the cocaine trade, namely: via family members, through their own ini-
tiative, or through the exercise of a particular job or profession (especially in the expedition
sector, taxi and catering industries). Potential financial rewards are a universal motive for invol-
vement in the cocaine trade. Yet for those acting at upper levels, it seems that trading itself is
more important than the goods they trade in. This probably explains why many cocaine dea-
lers have been involved in a whole range of other illegal trade practices during their lifetime.
The trade that offers the most favourable financial perspectives and the nicest personal con-
tacts at any given moment is the one taken up.
Some of the research findings are in line with earlier research conducted on Dutch cocai-
ne upper level trafficking in the Netherlands (Kleemans 1998, 2002; Zaitch 2002), or on
crack-cocaine dealers in American cities (Bourgois 1995), while a different methodology was
used (formal open interviews) with a different group of respondents (mainly Dutch, mainly
middle and lower levels, many in prison). However, the detailed and rich material collected
enables us to further our understanding of cocaine middle markets in the Netherlands both at
the micro and macro level.   
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Dina Siegel, 2005, Russische bizniz, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff. 
This is an anthropological study from ‘inside’ the Russian immigrant community in the
Netherlands. The author gives a detailed analysis of the links between the immigrants and the
Russian and Israeli mafia, and examines cases of criminal activity, such as trafficking in drugs
and women; financial and economic crimes; and the illegal trade in weapons and art. She des-
cribes a series of unsolved murders of Russian businessmen in the Netherlands, not only based
on police data, but also on the information and evidence available in the immigrant commu-
nity, which brings to light the discrepancies between the ‘official’ Dutch image of the Russian
Mafioso and the perceptions of Russians. The transnational character of Russian organized
crime is illustrated by empirical data from different countries in Europe, as well as from the
United States.  
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